The Arab Spring uprisings constitute one of the more significant political events of the early 21st century, especially when considered in terms of international relations and foreign policy analysis. Of these uprisings—first in Tunisia, then Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Syria, and Yemen—none have been more violent and politically contentious than the Libyan revolution. In light of both the rhetorical and militaristic ferocity with which Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi cracked down upon his own citizens, the international community—insofar as it is represented by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—responded with UNSC resolution 1973. That resolution was the first to acknowledge, by name, the responsibility to protect as a justificatory principle for intervention.
On October 23rd, 2011, the end of the Libyan revolution was declared. This declaration was made three days after a graphic video depicting the dead and bloodied body of Qaddafi circulated the worldwide web within mere hours of his death. So what happens next? How does a state with virtually no governmental institutions, other than the dead or captive Qaddafi family, construct an effective system of governance? What does the Libyan situation mean for a dynamic international system? In order to answer these questions, I utilize a tripartite hermeneutic consisting of an international system, state-level, and individual analyses. Given the difficulties of discerning any coherent governmental system during the revolution, alongside the nascence of the National Transitional Council today, the majority of my analysis focuses on the first of these three hermeneutics, i.e. the international system analysis. More particularly, I focus on the implications of the Libyan situation upon the emergence of the responsibility to protect as an international legal norm. Despite the paucity of information regarding the current structure and future prospects of the new Libyan government, I pursue a comparable state- and individual-level analysis, albeit brief. In the first instance, I provide significant background to the concepts of collective security, humanitarian intervention, and international law, generally.
Questions of humanitarian intervention, especially within the international legal framework, are tightly bound to competing conceptions of state sovereignty. The norm of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states has been codified in international law by numerous treaties, most authoritatively so in Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations.[1] Depending upon the interpretation of international law, humanitarian intervention more or less directly conflicts with the rigid and absolutist perspective of state sovereignty held by states such as, inter alia, Russia and China. Especially when the international legal regime is viewed as a consent-based system, humanitarian intervention threatens to undermine systemic stability. More and more, however, concern for human security and human dignity have come to supersede ideas of unlimited sovereignty in customary law—particularly in the governmental consciousness of states like the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere in Europe—and it is from this perspective that humanitarian intervention gains some international legal traction.
Armstrong et al define humanitarian intervention as, “the use of force to support aid and reconstruction operations in failed states and stop massive human rights abuses by murderous states.”[2] Thus defined, humanitarian intervention entails placing caveats on the concept of sovereignty, i.e. sovereigns have a responsibility to ensure that standards of human rights are upheld. If states are no longer capable or willing, in the case of “murderous states,” to uphold those standards, a residual responsibility falls to the international community of states. In the case of Libya, it was clear that the Qaddafi regime had no intention of upholding this responsibility in the face of a popular uprising. For decades, in fact, the Libyan government under Qaddafi easily fell into the category of chronic human rights abusers. In the spring of 2011, that chronic abuse made a distinct shift to the unabashed use of force, thereby forfeiting—wholesale—the responsibility to protect. From a strictly legal perspective, that responsibility then fell to the UNSC to determine a breach of international peace and security under Chapter VII of the Charter. The crux of this issue lies in defining state failure and “massive human rights abuses” as threats to international peace and security. Clearly this was the case in Libya—at least in the eyes of the Security Council—but first let us explore the international legal implications before moving on to a more thorough analysis of the Libyan uprising in particular.
Antonio Cassese illuminates the precarious nature of the relationship between human dignity and international peace, asserting, “The SC is eager to retain discretionary power in this matter and tends to avoid explaining the nature of the link [between humanitarian crises and international peace] and the reasons for its action.”[3] Despite its increasing concern for human security, the international community of states remains reluctant to delineate a legal “right” to humanitarian intervention with any precision. Without any such definition, the legal framework for humanitarian intervention continues to be rooted in custom, and thus legal interpretations of intervention are deeply tied to political will and state action. The Libyan intervention marked a turning point in international relations, insofar as the responsibility to protect was invoked by name in UNSC resolution 1973, justifying an intervention on humanitarian grounds and authorizing member states, “to take all necessary measures…to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.”[4] This is not the first time that the United Nations has played a foundational role in the evolution of international norms, and it is to this point that I now turn.
Over time, the United Nations has acted through the Security Council in response to gross human rights violations by deploying a wide range of peacekeeping operations. By defining these violations as threats to international peace and security, the Security Council has progressively brought human rights under the umbrella of the collective security agenda. Historically, the theory of collective security has mainly focused on preventing, reacting to, and punishing interstate aggression. The changing nature of warfare has complicated the theory of collective security, what Weiss calls “new war.”[5] The increasing prevalence of intrastate warfare, especially wars waged by non-state actors such as the Libyan rebel forces, has necessitated a reinterpretation of collective security. Thus today, collective security has come to include matters that were previously subsumed under the banner of domestic jurisdiction. Weiss acknowledges that the eroding distinction between domestic and international jurisdiction has become problematic for states and international institutions seeking to interpret the legal status of humanitarian intervention.[6] As mentioned above, national interests and the political will of the day affect the ways in which questions about humanitarian intervention are responded to by the United Nations and other international organizations concerned with peace and security. The Libyan situation is no exception. It is clear that, for a variety of reasons, the crisis in Libya elicited a sufficient response in terms of national interest and political will to warrant a vehement response, especially on the part of NATO (more particularly France and the United Kingdom). This point is particularly salient considering the permanent, veto-wielding positions of Russia and China on the Security Council. I have written on this question elsewhere, specifically focusing on the reasoning behind the Chinese abstention from the vote on resolution 1973.[7] Whatever the reasons behind the adoption of resolution 1973, it is obvious that the responsibility to protect—as an emerging international legal norm—is far from being a universal principle that can guide humanitarian intervention.
Without a specific definition of what kinds of violations dictate humanitarian intervention, or how those interventions should be carried out, and by whom, the implementation of collective security theory (the broader theory underwriting the responsibility to protect framework) to maintain human rights standards will remain sporadic, uneven, and unequal. Weiss posits, “effective institutionalization—the final component for successful collective security—is still evolving for the world organization.”[8] This begs the question: how is collective security evolving? We can look to the emerging norm of the responsibility to protect as a re-conceptualized or ‘evolved’ instantiation of collective security theory. But even in light of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty report on the responsibility to protect, the normative framework remains underdeveloped.[9] Without a determined set of rules and procedures for enforcing the responsibility to protect through institutions, the wide distance between “moral rhetoric” and “political reality”[10] shows no signs of abating. As a fledgling custom in international law, the responsibility to protect remains dependent upon the actions of the powerful who, in the end, decide when, how, and for whom it will be invoked. The ever-expanding system of international governance will surely continue to affect the processes and outcomes of humanitarian intervention, and the Arab Spring promises to play a critical role in that development. Although, for the time being, it seems that the international system will be contained within a period of transition, oscillating between the outer boundaries of sovereignty and the limits of intervention.
Thus I conclude my analysis of the Libya in terms of the systematic factors influencing foreign policy, and I now turn to a state-level analysis of the newly constructed National Transitional Council (NTC). In this section, I also look to the individual-level of analysis, as it is difficult to separate an analysis of the fledgling Libyan government institutions from the men who control them at this point. With regard to the emerging governmental framework of the NTC, the most prominent concerns (beyond the maintenance of internal order) are the potential influence of pan-Islamism, the threat of retribution by the new leaders toward Qaddafi loyalists, and the continued cultivation of regional sectarianism. The influence of Islam in the new Libyan government is twofold: the proclaimed intention of constructed a new constitution that will closely resemble Sharia law; and the inclusion or exclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood in national politics.[11] In this regard, perhaps the most important question is this: does the instantiation of Sharia law in conjunction with a strong Muslim presence in the Libyan government reflect the will of the people? According to The Economist, “Some say the Islamists are set to fill the vacuum. Few Libyans say openly that they back Mr. Belhaj (perhaps the most prominent Islamist in Libyan politics), but he is impressing people by clamping down on unregistered guns.”[12] This passage accurately reflects the current domestic political climate in Libya. Islamism may or may not be the most desirable direction for the new government, but, as a political affiliation, Islamism offers the most powerful and effective leaders, such as Alamin Belhaj. In contrast to Mahmoud Jibril, the highly criticized prime-minister-by-default who served during and immediately following the revolution, men like Belhaj may provide a much needed sense of stability in the uncertain days that lay ahead.
Concerning the threat of retribution, evidence has already come to fore suggesting that the rebel forces perpetrated serious human rights abuses during and subsequent to the revolution that deposed Qaddafi.[13] Peter Broukaert, the emergencies director at Human Rights Watch was quoted saying, “The evidence suggests that some of the victims were shot while being held as prisoners, when that part of Sirte was controlled by anti-Gaddafi brigades who appear to act outside the control of the National Transitional Council.”[14] One of the main challenges facing the NTC will be to reign in these anti-Qaddafi fighters in the coming months, if only to ensure that more atrocities such as this are not committed in the name of the new national government.[15] This task is tightly linked to the prevention of regional sectarianism. Under Qaddafi’s rule, this form of nonreligious sectarianism was cultivated, most likely as a tool to prevent the kind of popular uprising that eventually led to the demise of his regime. Those tensions, regional in nature, appear to be continuing today. According to the Nossiter, “In the barren political landscape that is the legacy of Colonel Qaddafi’s 42 years in power, the weak interim government has struggled to calm incendiary regional and factional disputes or exert control even over its own militias.”[16] This clearly harkens back to my last point regarding the retributive justice killings in Qaddafi’s hometown of Sirte. Moreover, this quote reiterates the lack of power that the NTC is able to wield over the chaotic domestic situation.
Adding insult to this particular injury are the politics involved with regionalism within the NTC itself. The majority of the 51-member NTC is composed of Eastern Libyans. Not only did the revolution begin in the Eastern city of Benghazi, the majority of post-revolution celebrations have been held in there, and not the capital Tripoli or Misurata in the West.[17] This has further strained the already tense atmosphere that currently pervades Libyan politics. Hopefully, though, these tensions are merely temporary, and simply an intrinsic facet of the process of political transition. Within three months, “The transitional council is scheduled to select a new interim government…Elections for a 200-member national council will be held within eight months, and a full government is to be elected a year after that.”[18] With these prospects in the near future, and a transitional council that is seemingly sympathetic to the concept of democracy, there is still hope that the Libyan revolution will be remembered as an expression of the people’s will to overthrow a merciless dictator and establish a truly democratic system of government.
Finally, I now pursue an individual-level analysis of the recently elected prime minister, Abdurrahim al-Keib, who was elected on October 31st by the NTC. Keib was elected by 26 of those 51 members. According to the BBC, “Mr. Keib’s narrow victory over eight other candidates shows the deep divisions in the NTC.”[19] Keib’s election was only made possible, of course, by the resignation of the default prime minister during the revolution, Mahmoud Jibril. Certainly, Jibril’s resignation is a positive signal in terms of the prospects for true democracy. Despite the divisions within the NTC, it seems that Keib will be able to garner significant support among the Libyan people. An academic by profession, Keib is one of few experienced leaders in the NTC that is unconnected with the Qaddafi regime, unlike Jibril (a former economic advisor) or Mustafa Jalil (a former justice minister).[20] Formerly an engineering professor at the University of Alabama, there is evidence to support the view the Keib will be much more sympathetic to the West, the United States in particular, than the Qaddafi regime. Likewise, Keib time in the United States lends to his professed concern with human rights and human dignity.[21]
In all of this, there are worrisome uncertainties. But there is also hope for a more prosperous future. With regard to the international system, Libya has played an integral role in the shaping of a new legal norm that promises to prevent and punish the most egregious human rights violations with institutional force. In the coming months, with increasing stability and an important economic resource (oil) that is no longer in the hands of an oppressive dictator, Libya has the opportunity to become a much more powerful regional player in the Middle East and North Africa. Domestically, the coming elections, if they go smoothly, will represent the actualization of the principles of the revolution, and a breath of fresh, democratic air in the region. Mr. Keib will be instrumental in this process. The uncertainties of authoritarian Islamism, retributive justice, and regional sectarianism, while significant, are not insurmountable. The degree to which the NTC follows through with the rhetoric of revolution will determine the future landscape of, not only Libya, but also the entire region.
[1] Armstrong, David, Theo Farrel, Helene Lambert, International Law and International Relations (Cambridge: University Press, 2007), pp. 131
[2] Ibid, pp. 131
[3] Cassese, International Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 347, qtd. Armstrong, supra note 53, pp. 134
[4] UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1973 (2011) [on the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya], 17 March 2011, S/RES/1973(2011)
[5] Weiss, Thomas G., David Forsythe, Roger Coate, Kelly-Kate Pease, The United Nations and Changing World Politics (Westview Press, 2010), pp. 15
[6] Ibid, pp. 15
[7] Lord, Rob “China and Libya: Article Analysis” (paper for Comparative Foreign Policy, Hendrix College, Conway, Arkansas, Sept. 19th, 2011). For more on the motivations behind the Chinese abstention see, “The Libyan Dilemma: China’s Evolving Foreign Policy,” The Economist, September 10, 2011, 45-46
[8] Weiss, pp. 17
[9] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty “The Responsibility to Protect” (International Development Research Center, December 2001) pp. 11-16
[10] Weiss, pp. 103
[11] “Alamin Belhaj on Governing Libya: Freedom is Their Reward” The Economist Online (Sept. 20th, 2011): http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2011/09/alamin-belhaj-governing-libya
[12] “Libya’s Revolution: Messy Politics, Perky Economics” The Economist, October 8th, 2011, vol. 401, no. 8754
[13] “Libya: Apparent Execution of 53 Gaddafi Supporters” Human Rights Watch (Oct. 24, 2011): http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/10/24/libya-apparent-execution-53-gaddafi-supporters
[14] Ibid
[15] Clearly the issue of government complicity in these killings would be difficult to prove or justify considering the lack of evidence available, as well as the opaque nature of the rebel chain of command. Thus it is likely that, in this particular case, the international courts will remain uninvolved.
[16] Nossiter, Adam and Kareem Fahim, “Revolution Won, Top Libyan Official Vows a New More Pious State,” The New York Times Oct. 23, 2011.
[17] Ibid
[18] Ibid
[19] “Libya’s Prime Minister Abdurrahim al-Keib in Profile,” The British Broadcasting Corporation, Nov. 2, 2011
[20] Ibid
[21] Ibid
