Libyan Implications and Predictions: A Tripartite Hermeneutic

The Arab Spring uprisings constitute one of the more significant political events of the early 21^st century, especially when considered in terms of international relations and foreign policy analysis. Of these uprisings—first in Tunisia, then Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Syria, and Yemen—none have been more violent and politically contentious than the Libyan revolution. In light of both the rhetorical and militaristic ferocity with which Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi cracked down upon his own citizens, the international community—insofar as it is represented by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—responded with UNSC resolution 1973. That resolution was the first to acknowledge, by name, the responsibility to protect as a justificatory principle for intervention.

On October 23^rd, 2011, the end of the Libyan revolution was declared. This declaration was made three days after a graphic video depicting the dead and bloodied body of Qaddafi circulated the worldwide web within mere hours of his death. So what happens next? How does a state with virtually no governmental institutions, other than the dead or captive Qaddafi family, construct an effective system of governance? What does the Libyan situation mean for a dynamic international system? In order to answer these questions, I utilize a tripartite hermeneutic consisting of an international system, state-level, and individual analyses. Given the difficulties of discerning any coherent governmental system during the revolution, alongside the nascence of the National Transitional Council today, the majority of my analysis focuses on the first of these three hermeneutics, i.e. the international system analysis. More particularly, I focus on the implications of the Libyan situation upon the emergence of the responsibility to protect as an international legal norm. Despite the paucity of information regarding the current structure and future prospects of the new Libyan government, I pursue a comparable state- and individual-level analysis, albeit brief. In the first instance, I provide significant background to the concepts of collective security, humanitarian intervention, and international law, generally.

Questions of humanitarian intervention, especially within the international legal framework, are tightly bound to competing conceptions of state sovereignty. The norm of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states has been codified in international law by numerous treaties, most authoritatively so in Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations.[1] Depending upon the interpretation of international law, humanitarian intervention more or less directly conflicts with the rigid and absolutist perspective of state sovereignty held by states such as, inter alia, Russia and China. Especially when the international legal regime is viewed as a consent-based system, humanitarian intervention threatens to undermine systemic stability. More and more, however, concern for human security and human dignity have come to supersede ideas of unlimited sovereignty in customary law—particularly in the governmental consciousness of states like the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere in Europe—and it is from this perspective that humanitarian intervention gains some international legal traction.

Armstrong et al define humanitarian intervention as, “the use of force to support aid and reconstruction operations in failed states and stop massive human rights abuses by murderous states.”[2] Thus defined, humanitarian intervention entails placing caveats on the concept of sovereignty, i.e. sovereigns have a responsibility to ensure that standards of human rights are upheld. If states are no longer capable or willing, in the case of “murderous states,” to uphold those standards, a residual responsibility falls to the international community of states. In the case of Libya, it was clear that the Qaddafi regime had no intention of upholding this responsibility in the face of a popular uprising. For decades, in fact, the Libyan government under Qaddafi easily fell into the category of chronic human rights abusers. In the spring of 2011, that chronic abuse made a distinct shift to the unabashed use of force, thereby forfeiting—wholesale—the responsibility to protect. From a strictly legal perspective, that responsibility then fell to the UNSC to determine a breach of international peace and security under Chapter VII of the Charter. The crux of this issue lies in defining state failure and “massive human rights abuses” as threats to international peace and security. Clearly this was the case in Libya—at least in the eyes of the Security Council—but first let us explore the international legal implications before moving on to a more thorough analysis of the Libyan uprising in particular.

Antonio Cassese illuminates the precarious nature of the relationship between human dignity and international peace, asserting, “The SC is eager to retain discretionary power in this matter and tends to avoid explaining the nature of the link [between humanitarian crises and international peace] and the reasons for its action.”[3] Despite its increasing concern for human security, the international community of states remains reluctant to delineate a legal “right” to humanitarian intervention with any precision. Without any such definition, the legal framework for humanitarian intervention continues to be rooted in custom, and thus legal interpretations of intervention are deeply tied to political will and state action. The Libyan intervention marked a turning point in international relations, insofar as the responsibility to protect was invoked by name in UNSC resolution 1973, justifying an intervention on humanitarian grounds and authorizing member states, “to take all necessary measures…to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.”[4] This is not the first time that the United Nations has played a foundational role in the evolution of international norms, and it is to this point that I now turn.

Over time, the United Nations has acted through the Security Council in response to gross human rights violations by deploying a wide range of peacekeeping operations. By defining these violations as threats to international peace and security, the Security Council has progressively brought human rights under the umbrella of the collective security agenda. Historically, the theory of collective security has mainly focused on preventing, reacting to, and punishing interstate aggression. The changing nature of warfare has complicated the theory of collective security, what Weiss calls “new war.”[5] The increasing prevalence of intrastate warfare, especially wars waged by non-state actors such as the Libyan rebel forces, has necessitated a reinterpretation of collective security. Thus today, collective security has come to include matters that were previously subsumed under the banner of domestic jurisdiction. Weiss acknowledges that the eroding distinction between domestic and international jurisdiction has become problematic for states and international institutions seeking to interpret the legal status of humanitarian intervention.[6] As mentioned above, national interests and the political will of the day affect the ways in which questions about humanitarian intervention are responded to by the United Nations and other international organizations concerned with peace and security. The Libyan situation is no exception. It is clear that, for a variety of reasons, the crisis in Libya elicited a sufficient response in terms of national interest and political will to warrant a vehement response, especially on the part of NATO (more particularly France and the United Kingdom). This point is particularly salient considering the permanent, veto-wielding positions of Russia and China on the Security Council. I have written on this question elsewhere, specifically focusing on the reasoning behind the Chinese abstention from the vote on resolution 1973.[7] Whatever the reasons behind the adoption of resolution 1973, it is obvious that the responsibility to protect—as an emerging international legal norm—is far from being a universal principle that can guide humanitarian intervention.

Without a specific definition of what kinds of violations dictate humanitarian intervention, or how those interventions should be carried out, and by whom, the implementation of collective security theory (the broader theory underwriting the responsibility to protect framework) to maintain human rights standards will remain sporadic, uneven, and unequal. Weiss posits, “effective institutionalization—the final component for successful collective security—is still evolving for the world organization.”[8] This begs the question: how is collective security evolving? We can look to the emerging norm of the responsibility to protect as a re-conceptualized or ‘evolved’ instantiation of collective security theory. But even in light of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty report on the responsibility to protect, the normative framework remains underdeveloped.[9] Without a determined set of rules and procedures for enforcing the responsibility to protect through institutions, the wide distance between “moral rhetoric” and “political reality”[10] shows no signs of abating. As a fledgling custom in international law, the responsibility to protect remains dependent upon the actions of the powerful who, in the end, decide when, how, and for whom it will be invoked. The ever-expanding system of international governance will surely continue to affect the processes and outcomes of humanitarian intervention, and the Arab Spring promises to play a critical role in that development. Although, for the time being, it seems that the international system will be contained within a period of transition, oscillating between the outer boundaries of sovereignty and the limits of intervention.

Thus I conclude my analysis of the Libya in terms of the systematic factors influencing foreign policy, and I now turn to a state-level analysis of the newly constructed National Transitional Council (NTC). In this section, I also look to the individual-level of analysis, as it is difficult to separate an analysis of the fledgling Libyan government institutions from the men who control them at this point. With regard to the emerging governmental framework of the NTC, the most prominent concerns (beyond the maintenance of internal order) are the potential influence of pan-Islamism, the threat of retribution by the new leaders toward Qaddafi loyalists, and the continued cultivation of regional sectarianism. The influence of Islam in the new Libyan government is twofold: the proclaimed intention of constructed a new constitution that will closely resemble Sharia law; and the inclusion or exclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood in national politics.[11] In this regard, perhaps the most important question is this: does the instantiation of Sharia law in conjunction with a strong Muslim presence in the Libyan government reflect the will of the people? According to The Economist, “Some say the Islamists are set to fill the vacuum. Few Libyans say openly that they back Mr. Belhaj (perhaps the most prominent Islamist in Libyan politics), but he is impressing people by clamping down on unregistered guns.”[12] This passage accurately reflects the current domestic political climate in Libya. Islamism may or may not be the most desirable direction for the new government, but, as a political affiliation, Islamism offers the most powerful and effective leaders, such as Alamin Belhaj. In contrast to Mahmoud Jibril, the highly criticized prime-minister-by-default who served during and immediately following the revolution, men like Belhaj may provide a much needed sense of stability in the uncertain days that lay ahead.

Concerning the threat of retribution, evidence has already come to fore suggesting that the rebel forces perpetrated serious human rights abuses during and subsequent to the revolution that deposed Qaddafi.[13] Peter Broukaert, the emergencies director at Human Rights Watch was quoted saying, “The evidence suggests that some of the victims were shot while being held as prisoners, when that part of Sirte was controlled by anti-Gaddafi brigades who appear to act outside the control of the National Transitional Council.”[14] One of the main challenges facing the NTC will be to reign in these anti-Qaddafi fighters in the coming months, if only to ensure that more atrocities such as this are not committed in the name of the new national government.[15] This task is tightly linked to the prevention of regional sectarianism. Under Qaddafi’s rule, this form of nonreligious sectarianism was cultivated, most likely as a tool to prevent the kind of popular uprising that eventually led to the demise of his regime. Those tensions, regional in nature, appear to be continuing today. According to the Nossiter, “In the barren political landscape that is the legacy of Colonel Qaddafi’s 42 years in power, the weak interim government has struggled to calm incendiary regional and factional disputes or exert control even over its own militias.”[16] This clearly harkens back to my last point regarding the retributive justice killings in Qaddafi’s hometown of Sirte. Moreover, this quote reiterates the lack of power that the NTC is able to wield over the chaotic domestic situation.

Adding insult to this particular injury are the politics involved with regionalism within the NTC itself. The majority of the 51-member NTC is composed of Eastern Libyans. Not only did the revolution begin in the Eastern city of Benghazi, the majority of post-revolution celebrations have been held in there, and not the capital Tripoli or Misurata in the West.[17] This has further strained the already tense atmosphere that currently pervades Libyan politics. Hopefully, though, these tensions are merely temporary, and simply an intrinsic facet of the process of political transition. Within three months, “The transitional council is scheduled to select a new interim government…Elections for a 200-member national council will be held within eight months, and a full government is to be elected a year after that.”[18] With these prospects in the near future, and a transitional council that is seemingly sympathetic to the concept of democracy, there is still hope that the Libyan revolution will be remembered as an expression of the people’s will to overthrow a merciless dictator and establish a truly democratic system of government.

Finally, I now pursue an individual-level analysis of the recently elected prime minister, Abdurrahim al-Keib, who was elected on October 31^st by the NTC. Keib was elected by 26 of those 51 members. According to the BBC, “Mr. Keib’s narrow victory over eight other candidates shows the deep divisions in the NTC.”[19] Keib’s election was only made possible, of course, by the resignation of the default prime minister during the revolution, Mahmoud Jibril. Certainly, Jibril’s resignation is a positive signal in terms of the prospects for true democracy. Despite the divisions within the NTC, it seems that Keib will be able to garner significant support among the Libyan people. An academic by profession, Keib is one of few experienced leaders in the NTC that is unconnected with the Qaddafi regime, unlike Jibril (a former economic advisor) or Mustafa Jalil (a former justice minister).[20] Formerly an engineering professor at the University of Alabama, there is evidence to support the view the Keib will be much more sympathetic to the West, the United States in particular, than the Qaddafi regime. Likewise, Keib time in the United States lends to his professed concern with human rights and human dignity.[21]

In all of this, there are worrisome uncertainties. But there is also hope for a more prosperous future. With regard to the international system, Libya has played an integral role in the shaping of a new legal norm that promises to prevent and punish the most egregious human rights violations with institutional force. In the coming months, with increasing stability and an important economic resource (oil) that is no longer in the hands of an oppressive dictator, Libya has the opportunity to become a much more powerful regional player in the Middle East and North Africa. Domestically, the coming elections, if they go smoothly, will represent the actualization of the principles of the revolution, and a breath of fresh, democratic air in the region. Mr. Keib will be instrumental in this process. The uncertainties of authoritarian Islamism, retributive justice, and regional sectarianism, while significant, are not insurmountable. The degree to which the NTC follows through with the rhetoric of revolution will determine the future landscape of, not only Libya, but also the entire region.

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[1] Armstrong, David, Theo Farrel, Helene Lambert, International Law and International Relations (Cambridge: University Press, 2007), pp. 131

[2] Ibid, pp. 131

[3] Cassese, International Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 347, qtd. Armstrong, supra note 53, pp. 134

[4] UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1973 (2011) [on the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya], 17 March 2011, S/RES/1973(2011)

[5] Weiss, Thomas G., David Forsythe, Roger Coate, Kelly-Kate Pease, The United Nations and Changing World Politics (Westview Press, 2010), pp. 15

[6] Ibid, pp. 15

[7] Lord, Rob “China and Libya: Article Analysis” (paper for Comparative Foreign Policy, Hendrix College, Conway, Arkansas, Sept. 19^th, 2011). For more on the motivations behind the Chinese abstention see, “The Libyan Dilemma: China’s Evolving Foreign Policy,” The Economist, September 10, 2011, 45-46

[8] Weiss, pp. 17

[9] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty “The Responsibility to Protect” (International Development Research Center, December 2001) pp. 11-16

[10] Weiss, pp. 103

[11] “Alamin Belhaj on Governing Libya: Freedom is Their Reward” The Economist Online (Sept. 20^th, 2011): http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2011/09/alamin-belhaj-governing-libya

[12] “Libya’s Revolution: Messy Politics, Perky Economics” The Economist, October 8^th, 2011, vol. 401, no. 8754

[13] “Libya: Apparent Execution of 53 Gaddafi Supporters” Human Rights Watch (Oct. 24, 2011): http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/10/24/libya-apparent-execution-53-gaddafi-supporters

[14] Ibid

[15] Clearly the issue of government complicity in these killings would be difficult to prove or justify considering the lack of evidence available, as well as the opaque nature of the rebel chain of command. Thus it is likely that, in this particular case, the international courts will remain uninvolved.

[16] Nossiter, Adam and Kareem Fahim, “Revolution Won, Top Libyan Official Vows a New More Pious State,” The New York Times Oct. 23, 2011.

[17] Ibid

[18] Ibid

[19] “Libya’s Prime Minister Abdurrahim al-Keib in Profile,” The British Broadcasting Corporation, Nov. 2, 2011

[20] Ibid

[21] Ibid

The Price of Progress, or in Other Words...

25 June 2010

Kigali, Rwanda

I got a beer thrown in my face, and at the nicest restaurant in town at that. I was out to dinner with my internship supervisor and several colleagues for my good-bye dinner. I was teaching some of my colleagues, mildly new to Rwanda, the wonders of Mützig draft. We had originally been seated inside, but the football match was on and there was a jazz band playing outside, so we moved to the balcony. There was an ashtray on the table, so I lit a cigarette and carefully held it over the railing so as not to disturb the non-smoking dinner guests. About three puffs in, I was startled by the older British gentleman sitting in solitude at the table directly behind ours. He rudely, and very firmly, told me to put out my cigarette and get it away from him. Because I’m a nice guy, and also because he scared me a little bit, I put out my smoke. My supervisor, despite being a non-smoker herself, was offended by his lack of manners and subsequently went inside to tell the wait-staff. She came back and sat down at our table, telling me that it was a smoking area and to relight my cigarette. Not having to be told twice, I did so. Apparently, a waiter came out around the same time to ask the gentleman if he would like to move out of the smoking area since my smoke was bothering him. At that point, this man rose angrily from his chair, walked around to the other side of our table, politely asked my colleague sitting across the table to excuse him, grabbed her beer glass and threw it in my face. In the process he broke her glass, and immediately stormed off. Completely appalled, I had nothing to do but laugh. Ironically enough, he hadn’t extinguished my cigarette when he threw the beer. Thinking back, the way it turned out, I must have looked quite smug. After multiple apologies from the wait-staff and the manager of the hotel, I received a free polo shirt that fits surprisingly well.

The last few weeks, my last weeks in Rwanda, have been quite the comedy of errors. The beer incident and the 7 stitches from the wounds I incurred on my daring escape from the Congolese military are just two of many.

I recently wrote an opinion article for the NewTimes, Rwanda’s national newspaper. The article was about the international media’s recent coverage of Rwanda, and the prevailing perspective that the Rwandan government is excessively repressive and increasingly less democratic. My email was attached at the bottom of the article, and over the past several days I have received about 10 emails, many of which exemplify my frustrations with the media debate about this country. The debate is mainly composed of two, over-simplified arguments about Rwandan politics. Some emails came from “Proud Rwandans” who referred to me as a “champion” of their cause. Others were Westerners who had spent some amount of time in Rwanda, and most of them rebuked me for what they viewed as naïveté and misinformation.

The NewTimes is, first and foremost, a government-run newspaper. This means that articles published in the NewTimes are not generally critical of the government. And by generally, I mean never. Articles generally focus on government successes and reproach foreign media and government sources. This forms one extreme of the debate, the part of the debate that portrays the politics of this country as completely ethical and justified.

I have to admit that my article was diplomatically slanted. In fact, I showed a lot of support for Rwanda and its government. After cutting around 300 words, the article came out looking like a toothless fluff piece, just another article that falsely identifies the Rwandan state as supportive of civil society and the rule of law. For some reason, I found it necessary to mention the two journalists that work in East Africa and report for the New York Times. On some level, I find their work to be representative of the other extreme, the part of the debate that is hypercritical of the Rwandan government, and sometimes blindly supportive of unrestrained democracy and civil liberties.

Between these two extremes, there isn’t much. My article emphasized how one-sided the Western dialogue on Rwanda is, and how that dialogue is written relying on facts that, interpreted correctly, can support the thesis that Rwanda’s government is becoming more repressive leading up to the presidential elections in August and continues to use the genocide as a political trump card. What I did not, or perhaps could not, include in the article was a critique of the other side of the debate, that the NewTimes commits a similar folly by continuing to emphasize government rectitude and fervently denying any criticism. In the end, my article was just another piece of the debate that I was attempting to argue against.

Oddly enough, aside from its failings, my article led to some unexpected, and surprisingly positive outcomes. One of the reprimanding emails came from a friend of one of the journalists that I mentioned in my article. A short correspondence with her led to the reporter’s email address. Thoroughly intimidated by the situation, I postponed sending him an email, assuming that the entire situation would blow over in a week or so. To my ultimate amazement, a few days ago, I received an email from him asking if I would be interested in meeting for drinks. Despite criticizing his work for the Times in my article, I genuinely respect this reporter, and his invitation was received with a lot of enthusiasm. Actually meeting him only increased my respect, and provided a lot of insight into the world of the international media.

Despite all of the support I showed in my article, I must admit that the Rwandan government has given the international press a lot to criticize. Suspending two newspapers, detaining a political opponent and an international lawyer, and the so-called “Island Prison” have given the Western media good reason for “concern,” if I can call it that. I am not under the illusion that these “measures” taken by the government are not clear abuses of civil rights. They are, and there is no question about that. Perhaps it’s necessary, however, to ask different questions.

My article talked about particularity, regarding the Rwandan situation. 16 years ago this country was engulfed in a massive genocide that left nothing but destruction in its path. The numbers vary, depending on whom you talk to, anywhere from “several hundred thousand” to 850,000 to easily “over 1 million” people that were killed in 100 long days of hell.

In an earlier post, I talked about the singular story told by the Rwandan government about the “genocide against the Tutsi,” and how I felt that this was a misrepresentation of history. In reality, the murderous rampage consumed anyone who stood in the way of the genocidaires and their heinous crimes, regardless of ethnic background (especially considering what a fabrication ethnicity is in this country). Ethnicity, in my belief, was simply a tool used by the Habyarimana regime (and before that, the Belgians) to mobilize civilian participation in politically and economically motivated violence. When the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) launched their attack from Uganda, its outward motivation was the suffering of a minority under a racist government (there are several other theories, including the motivation of the Ugandan government to attain regional influence). Throughout 4 years of war with the Rwandan forces (MRND), the RPF ended the genocide and began rebuilding the country. Along the way, some 45,000 civilians, presumably Hutu, were killed by the RPF, a crime against humanity that has yet to be prosecuted, and is fervently denied by the current administration.

Today, the “ethnic” debate still exists. 16 years is a short period of time when discussing genocide. I know that it is an oversimplification to put it this way, but think of the Holocaust. It has been over half a century since the Third Reich attempted to systematically exterminate the Jews (among others). Yet it is still a very delicate topic for people, especially if their historical roots connect to Germany or Judaism. I’m sure that there are Holocaust Deniers that exist today, but how much attention do they truly get? For the most part, they remain in the realms of conspiracy and psychotic racism.

When the Kagame administration came to power, ethnic reconciliation was at the top of the agenda. It is not my belief that reconciliation efforts have succeeded in this country. How could they in only 16 years? In fact, I wonder if it will ever be possible for those efforts to attain success. As a state, how are those issues overcome then (especially when the head of that state has contributed so much to the conflict himself)? For the Kagame administration, the answer to that question has been to limit civil rights that might contradict the government’s efforts to maintain peace by papering over ethnic tension. Being here for a mere 6 months, I’ve only just begun to understand how real of a threat unrestrained free speech presents to the stability of this country. I no longer underestimate the brilliance of the Kagame administration.

Firstly: the two newspapers that were suspended. It is useful to recognize that these “news” papers were the equivalent of what we in America call tabloids. Sadly, that is not an aspect that is often presented by the Western media. Over and over again these papers insisted upon indiscriminately disseminating information that represented a direct affront to the government’s peacekeeping policy of altering history and pretending that reconciliation has been successful. Inflammatory language and accusatory content does not serve to maintain the powerful rhetoric that holds Rwanda together, however superficially.

Next: the arrest and bail of Peter Erlinder. Peter Erlinder was initially arrested in early June. Though he was never officially charged, the prosecution was ostensibly building a case based on the breach of Genocide Revision and Denial. Again, the Western media has failed to cover the most important aspects of this issue (despite the ridiculous amount of articles that have appeared over the past few weeks). Erlinder was not simply an American lawyer that took on the difficult task of defending those accused of genocide. And I do not believe that he was arrested for his work at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in Arusha, Tanzania. I’ve always found it ironic that the ICTR is in Arusha, given that it was there in the early ‘90s that the power-sharing agreement was signed between the Habiyarimana regime and the RPF. It was after signing that agreement that Habiyarimana lost the support of his most fervent Hutu-power supporters (including his own wife, Agathe who has only recently been charged as one of the architects of the genocide). Aside from the international debate that continues to rage onward, I am of the belief that it was these people that organized Habiyarimana’s assassination. Back to Erlinder however, as part international law, he has diplomatic immunity when it comes to his work at the ICTR. Even at Nuremberg the accused had a right to a defense. It was Erlinder’s writings outside of the ICTR that became quite contentious. The international media has basically ignored these writings, and instead portray Erlinder as some sort of freedom fighter for those oppressed by the Rwandan government. Taking the time to examine Erlinder’s opinions written outside of his position at the ICTR, one might realize just how offensive and conspiratorial those opinions are. He maintains a thoroughly revisionist account of history, claiming that a double genocide occurred and that the Permanent Five of the Security Council have rewritten the history of the genocide in order to maintain their own international reputations. Unlike Holocaust Deniers who remain socially stigmatized and in the darkest corners of the internet, Erlinder and his writings have gained a lot of attention. They have been widely publicized in East Africa easily accessible amongst those to whom the memory of the genocide remains particularly fresh. Erlinder, even back in the United States, represents a grave ideological threat. Not only does he shamelessly disregard the facts of history, but he also upsets the already delicate balance that has been carefully designed by the current administration. His prosecutors made a terrible judgment call when they brought in evidence for which Erlinder had diplomatic immunity. That was a mistake. Regardless of that fact, Erlinder blatantly violated Rwanda’s constitutional law. He knew that he had done so when he came here to defend an opposition politician that had been arrested for a similar crime.

Regardless of the superficiality of ethnic identity in Rwanda, the wounds from the genocide remain raw. People have not forgotten, and no matter how fabricated ethnicity actually may be, it’s very real now. The international community has reproached the Rwandan government, saying that the laws regarding Genocide Ideology, Revisionism, and Divisionism are too vague. They have been interpreted by the international media as tools used by the government to repress opposition politicians and subdue criticism from civil society. And sometimes they are. The question I’ve come to ask is about justification though. Whether or not there are genuine civil rights abuses (there are) and political repression (still debatable in my opinion) my judgment on those facts is based mostly on my Western bias and circumstantial evidence. My time here has taught me to take a much wider variety of information into account. Though some of that information may be anecdotal, it is necessary to rely on something aside from the international media.

One of the aspects I’ve begun to consider is the large population of Rwandese that live outside of the political realm- those who are living in poverty, those who are uneducated, or those who have no access to media sources (especially media sources that aren’t under the careful watch of the current administration). When questioning the viability of democracy in this country I think it’s important to consider the ability (or inability) of such a large population (very likely the majority) of Rwandese to make informed decisions about their leadership. As an American, I believe, perhaps idealistically so, in democracy and human rights. Questioning those beliefs, however, has become crucial to my understanding of this country. When it comes to political justification in Rwanda, the accessibility of understanding and information become crucial aspects of democratic potential. When it comes to free speech, taking into account the examples above, it is reasonably understood why the government maintains strict control over civil society, thus limiting the genuine pursuit of democracy.

In the upcoming August elections, everyone knows that Kagame will be re-elected. He has, for all practical purposes, led the country since 1994 (serving as vice president under Bizimungu until 2000). In total, by 2017 he will have served for 23 years- not a short time. Most people question whether or not, at the end of his final term, he will attempt to change the constitution effectively extending his stay in office. I don’t think that will happen. The real question in my mind is whether or not the next leader of this country will be Kagame’s protégé (or proxy), or if that leader will come from an opposition stance. Considering the current administration’s control over civil society, it seems unlikely that a legitimate opposition party will be able to actually develop (probably one of the reasons the government has such strict control over civil society). I say legitimate with the view that the current opposition candidates rely on the ethnic and historical debates present here (probably another reason why the government has such strict control over civil society). Until an opposition party that has a legitimate platform emerges, the current administration (or its affiliates) is justified in maintaining their leadership position. After all, the RPF has managed to build this country out of nothing in only 16 years. Recognizing the strides that this country has made under the current leadership, I question what opposition candidates might do differently or what they might have to offer aside from controversial changes in the retelling of history. Under the RPF, primary education has become free. As an American, I find it particularly ironic (nonetheless a great success) that this country has a universal healthcare system.

In a way, everything in this country is framed by it’s violent past, but in order to move past that, politicians and constituents have to stop relying on this rapidly aging debate and instead focus on issues of greater consequence. Of all the promise that this country shows, its gaping ethno-historical wounds restrain its progress.

Furthermore, considering socioeconomics and the elite of this country (or Kigali rather), I often ponder its relation to current politics and history. Since 1959, when the Belgians effectively switched allegiances from the Tutsi minority to the Hutu majority, ethnic violence began driving Rwandese into neighboring countries, Europe, and the U.S. The Diaspora only increased over nearly half a century of ethnic violence. When the RPF restored peace in ’94, the Diaspora (many of whom had been living in deplorable refugee situations) returned en masse. Under the Habiyarimana regime, one could say that education did not particularly thrive. The general instability of Rwanda during that period did not provide much in terms of educational capacity. When the Diaspora returned however, they returned with Western (or Ugandan) education. Out of the political and economic collapse of the genocide came a group of well-educated individuals (who spoke English I might add) that helped to restore the country’s stability and promoted the astounding success since ’94. Therefore, when it comes to the rising generation, those in their late 20s or early 30s that are to be the future leaders of this country, they are generally former members of the Diaspora, and children of the returning elite. It follows then, that some of the government’s most influential supporters have a vested interest in maintaining the current version of history. The Diaspora- the people that were driven out of their homeland only to watch their fellow countrymen be ruthlessly tortured and killed- have a strong motivation to maintain that history. “Never Again” is a compelling rhetoric, especially for the historical victims.

Progress, like that made by Rwanda, always comes at a price. Perhaps that price is the suspension of civil and political rights. Perhaps I need more time. Taking all of this into account, I suppose it’s easy to see why no one has attempted to illustrate a well-rounded image of Rwanda and its politics. There are truths here that cannot be broached comfortably (or in a reasonable amount of words). Because of those difficulties, attempts to understand often transform into awkward comedy. I’m reminded of the man who threw the beer in my face and the Westerners that chastised my naïveté. I don’t understand their history or their perspective (beer guy was probably having a bad day, and the emails were probably a response from people who respect the opinion of Josh Kron more so than that of a 20-year-old intern). Understanding Rwanda, however, is much more difficult and correspondingly more consequential. I am sad to leave this beautiful country, with its rolling hills and wonderfully mild climate, because I know that there is still more to discover. Although, even if I stayed here for the rest of my life, I would in all likelihood feel the same way. The progress that I have made in the past 6 months is similar to that of Rwanda- it has come at a price. I have to admit though, that understanding myself is easier than understanding my current surroundings. I’m not so worried about going back to Western culture, or reverse culture shock. In fact, I’m not really worried at all, because I know that the price of my own progress is this intensified passion of understanding.

All About Adventure

30 May 2010

Kigali, Rwanda

Someone recently said to me, “You are in Africa, don’t take that fact for granted.” It made me think about adventure and adventuring. I have 4 short weeks left before I head to that other continent (where adventure seems so easy), and I sometimes forget where I am. It’s so easy to forget that I’m actually somewhere different, somewhere that I should savor every moment. The excitement that accompanies international travel has sort of worn off, and I’ve become complacently comfortable in my surroundings. The boulevards lined with palm trees, the roundabouts filled with well-kept shrubbery and monumental fountains, the mild weather, the sunny skies and mid-70s- sometimes I think I’ve been hoodwinked, that they just sent me to L.A.

This week was difficult, dealing with the hardship of internship, the firm hand of Biblical law, and the arbitrary administration of justice- I caught myself falling into the trap of what I have previously referred to as “mzungu problems.” And then I realize that I am in Africa, and it gives me some perspective. I remember my first few weeks here, the wonderment I experienced about this culture, and how naïve I must have been. I remember the women’s group that I met. The phrases “make your bed” and “soap and salt” start to mean something again. And now that I’m floating around Kigali, completing an internship and committing youthful shenanigans with the socioeconomic elite of Rwanda*, the theme of adventure has gone unexpressed, at least consciously. The point is that I’ve become less naïve; at least I’d like to think so. And ignorance is supposed to be bliss.

So adventure means something else now. On Monday nights I go to trivia night at one of the “mzungu restaurants” in town. It’s within walking distance from our house and they sell beer for twice as much as truly local restaurants. It’s a beautiful atmosphere- ivy covered lattice and a spectacular view of the city at night, lights sparkling on the hillside. An Italian man owns the restaurant, and they serve excellent pizza that far exceeds my daily per diem. On Mondays, and most other nights, the restaurant is filled with expats, mostly NGOs workers and specialists from the West. Table after table is surrounded by a group of national homogeneity. I’m not attempting to degrade these groups. They’ve found comfort in one another and in the recreations of Western culture that Kigali offers in the form of a large shopping center and a variety of over-priced restaurants. In many ways, they are experiencing this culture, and know it better than I do. I respect them. But when I look at the people I sit with, I can’t help but feel a sense of pride. On Mondays, Morgan and I make the walk to Sole Luna from our house, usually early to secure a good table. And we don’t sit with expats. Since I’ve been here, one way or another, I’ve connected more with a group of Rwandans than I have with most other expats, not to say that I don’t have expat friends. And I’m proud of that fact. I don’t mean to objectify those friends, or make them trophies of some kind that say I’m culturally sensitive, because, in most ways I’m not. That’s what makes our friendship so meaningful to me. I’ve found some great friends here. And when I look around the table on Monday nights, I look at people with whom I can laugh, and joke, and talk about politics and philosophy, and trivialities at the same time. I don’t look at people whose nationality makes them more conveniently similar to me. In that I find adventure. For most of my life I’ve been surrounded by cultural homogeneity. And now I’m completely out of my element. Somehow, though, I’ve found people I connect with on a level that far exceeds superficiality. Somehow, on the other side of the globe, in a society that has until now been completely foreign to my existence, I’ve begun a great adventure. And that adventure is more than safaris and the Nile. This adventure is deeper and more personal. I’m in Africa and I’m learning to remember that, to savor every moment, and not just every moment that sounds good when I tell it to other Americans when I return to the States. I savor the moments for myself, when I’m yelling at Sunny about Rwandese politics or eating a whole lot of pork, and still not eating as much as everyone else. All of these experiences, however insignificant, remind me where I am. And being in Africa really is an adventure.

This is Africa, a bit Like Marx

23 May 2010

Kigali, Rwanda

I could do this in America- the lazy summer shenanigans. I’ve gotten lost in the lethargy of summer and the terminal mindset of having 5 weeks to go. And now I realize that 5 weeks is actually a really significant portion of the time that I’ve spent here; it’s enough time to do something new. I still have time to learn something, and I think I gave up on that for a little while.

As an expat, or at least someone who’s a part of that community, I think it’s easy to become discouraged- getting to know people only to see them leave at the end of their contract. There’s a sense of pomposity, or self-righteousness maybe, when you stay abroad for long enough. At least in my experience, it’s easy to begin thinking that I’ve seen everything, done everything, and that I have some idea what this country is like. In reality, I haven’t seen or done much, and I am only beginning to understand the broader outlines of the Rwandan experience. Sure, I’ve been to the genocide memorials, the Millennium Village (twice actually), some extremely rural areas, and the tourist hangouts on Lake Kivu among other places. And after all of that, I felt as if I’d accomplished something. Maybe I have. Recently though, I’ve caught myself falling into the numbness that often accompanies the warmer of the two solstices. The days are always the same length here, being so close to the equator, so I don’t even know if solstices are applicable. But you get what I’m trying to say.

My internship isn’t particularly challenging, as most internships aren’t. I spend my days reading the news, becoming completely consumed with the plethora of international crises, and intermittently completing the small amounts of work that I manage to get my hands on. Interning at the largest government institution in Rwanda, one might think there would be more work involved. But, as I’ve been reminded over and over again- “this is Africa.” And that’s supposed to serve as some sort of excuse.

My last entry was about “Embracing the Chaos.” For some people, that’s the culturally sensitive thing to do. Cultural sensitivity, however, just ends up being boring, and sometimes even this sort of arbitrary obedience to the way things are. When I really think about it, I’m a fairly insensitive person when it comes to the restrictions of cultural failings, at least in the States. So, really, why would I succumb to what I perceive as cultural limitations in another society? Of course, there’s always a level of decency that needs to be maintained in order to be successful and respectable. I’m not arguing against being polite or refraining from bringing up painful histories. I suppose I’m arguing against passively accepting inefficiency, or as some might say, “embracing the chaos.” Saying “T.I.A” (this is Africa) holds no significance for me anymore. Yes, this is Africa. Thank you for the reminder. Now, do something.

Now, linking this with my first paragraph, there’s this thing about social integration. Coming into a foreign society, I had this desire to assimilate, to become a part of that society, and, by doing that, to feel like I’ve done something meaningful. But maybe I’ve gone too far. Perhaps this is a stretch, an intellectualization of the simple fact that, for one reason or another, I’ve gotten lazy and homesick. Or maybe I’m just following the logic. Continuing with the latter assumption, my endeavors to assimilate, to “embrace the chaos,” and to accept that “this is Africa” have been successful. My naïveté with regard to interning at the RDB was that my work there could be meaningful. Thus, my assimilation into this culture has simply meant that I accept its failings. But now, reflecting on this, I realize that overcoming that apathy might be another step in experiential learning- accepting cultural shortcomings, and not being consumed by them. Making comparisons to other countries might be inaccurate, but I don’t support the conservative and often times bigoted culture of the Bible belt, and I don’t accept the culture under-aged sex trafficking in Thailand.

I’m not attempting to equate institutional inefficiency with bigotry or child sex slaves, but I think the analogy is valid. On the so-called “Dark Continent,” the acceptance of these cultural shackles in the face of development is unacceptable. Acknowledging those failings and attempting to embrace them is even more backwards. And it’s all the more challenging to know that I can’t fix it. That’s probably my American desire for perfection and instant gratification. It’s true though. As an outsider, I’m not in the position; I don’t really have the right to make such a critical analysis of Rwandan culture. Perhaps my argument is a bit like Marx and the proletariat. There will be no violent revolution of people that aren’t consistently late, that work efficiently and have effective time management skills- people that realize the importance of order in development. Perhaps only the tide of history will bring with it an upheaval of chaos, and the phrase “this is Africa” will be only an obsolete memory.

The truth is, I couldn’t do this in America. I’ve been knocked off of my horse called determination and landed in a puddle of apathy. Realizing that now, I need to get back on the horse.

Embracing the Chaos?

16 May 2010

Kigali, Rwanda

Today, a million women trapped me, but I’ll get to that later. I’m trying to give up my Western perspective, and it’s not working out very well. There has been an interesting succession of events over the past two days. Starting early Saturday morning, I could hear the throbbing beat of music emanating from the large stadium near our house. Walking to the bus stop, I realized that these sounds meant political support. Hundreds of people clad in RPF attire- shirts, hats, flags- flooded the streets, on foot, on moto taxis, and in dozens of buses. Red, white, and blue blanketed the bustling sidewalk, an eerie expression of support for the incumbent administration.

Once in town, everything seemed normal enough, overwhelming as usual. We went to the fabric warehouse, a mall of sorts-small rooms jutting off of a large corridor, each filled with six-foot high stacked bolts of fabric in every color and pattern. The warehouse has a much larger selection of fabric than Kimironko, the market, if anyone can believe that. But it’s remarkably less stressful. I was still greeted with “karibu,” (you are welcome) every time I entered a store, but after that I was left alone to shop, without the constant attention of the storeowners. Maybe I’m becoming more accustomed to the hustle and bustle of Kigali city life. Or maybe I look less like a mzungu. Or maybe I know where to go to avoid that sort of attention. I know how to say “I’m not called mzungu,” and that seems to help, especially when it comes to negotiating prices (“ntabwo ni twa mzungu”). I bought somewhere around 5 meters of fabric for less than $20. Haggling is almost enjoyable for me now, the drama of impossibility- getting a cab to town that supposed to cost around 3,000 Rwf, I’m told costs 5,000. Here’s the typical back and forth:

Driver- “Taxi?”

Rob- “(nods)”

Driver- “Enter!”

Rob- “Ni angahe (how much)?”

Driver- “5,000”

Rob- “Bof! Ntabwo ni twa mzungu. 2,500.”

Driver- “No, no. 5,000.”

Rob- “Ehhh, 3,000.”

Driver- “OK, 4,000”

Rob- “(starts to walk away)”

Driver- “OK, enter.”

Rob- “3,500?”

Driver- “OK, let’s go.”

VICTORY!

Living in a society where everything is for sale and everything is negotiable is difficult to get used to. I miss the days when I knew what things cost and items were clearly labeled. But I have to admit that shopping is more fun. There’s always the chance that I’m going to get jipped, and vendors almost always try to make me pay around 3-times as much as something genuinely costs because of the color of my skin. There’s a sense of adventure now, though, with every purchase that I make. The chaos is something I’ve begun to associate as being African. One of my co-workers frequently tells me to “embrace the chaos,” and I try to follow that advice everyday. It’s difficult though, to give up that part of my American-ness. The structure of the West is enviable, but there is a sense of losing something in that structure. Shopping here is a much more personal experience. You have to get much closer to vendors and other customers to attain success. The distance of scanners and bar codes is non-existent. As usual, I don’t know which system is “better” or “worse.”

Later that night, while I was at home eating dinner, there was the third grenade attack to hit Kigali. This time, as the U.S. Embassy mass email informed me, the attack occurred near the city center in Kiyovu, most likely very close to where I am currently writing this blog. The U.S. Embassy message didn’t give any other information, and it has been through other local sources that I have come to know that there was one casualty, and several injuries. The attack hasn’t appeared in any international news as of 3 p.m., and I have yet to see the New Times for today. Interestingly enough, the grenade attack that occurred on 4 March was not written about in the international press either. Popular belief of the motives behind these attacks has been Kagame’s impending reelection, to occur in August. Earlier this week, the main article on the front page of the New Times read “Kagame Confident of Ruling Party Victory.” Truthfully, I don’t know a single person who isn’t. But that article certainly doesn’t settle well with those who realize just how “confident” Kagame must be. The suspension of two local newspapers, the high profile arrest and bail of opposition leader Victoire Ingabire, the arrest and/or exile of four high ranking military officials, the deportation of a leading Human Rights Watch researcher, and the recent news coming out of the Times and BBC have left my human rights, democracy, American alert bells ringing. But what I have come to realize is that there is a different side to this story, and whether it’s a justification or not, I think it’s worth contemplating.

Starting with the suspension of these two newspapers, they actually did break certain laws regarding the press. Granted, these laws have been cited as being markedly vague and largely left up to the interpretation of an administration headed by a man who recently made Reporters Without Borders’ top five Predators of the Press list, but the suspensions were legal. And looking at the offenses in the context of Rwanda’s history, some comments made crossed some post-genocide lines. This has become a main theme in my thought processes regarding political issues in Rwanda, just how far does the government need to go in order to prevent the ethnic divisionism that, contrary to much Western opinion, still exists. And that brings me to the Ingabire question. Aside from making several comments that resemble the retaliatory genocide ideology of the early 90s, she doesn’t seem to have much of a political platform outside of simply opposing the Kagame administration. Objectively the situation seems to be easily understood- a Hutu opposition leader coming back to Rwanda after years of exile is almost immediately arrested under similarly vague laws. Seems like a question of political pluralism, and there’s a definite possibility that it is. There is also the possibility that it’s a question of national sovereignty and the prevention of recurring ethnic crises. The same questions will apply to the arrest and exile of several leading military officials. It could be part of a general shake up of the military, partly in response to the grenade attacks and suspected complicity. It could also be an extension of a systematic harassment and repression of any form of opposition to the Kagame administration. With the deportation of the Human Rights Watch’s leading researcher, more questions arise. Human Rights Watch has been in Rwanda since 1994, and since that time they have been critical of human rights in Rwanda. Many members of the Western press would like to assume that her deportation was a political move to prevent future criticisms, and to disregard the accusations against her faulty paperwork as falsified or the result of mismanaged bureaucracy. But looking at it from a different perspective we can see that it could just be a question of national sovereignty. If her papers were forged, something that seems unlikely for a top researcher working with one of the most well respected human rights groups in the world, then the government would have every right to deny her visa application, just as we would do in the United States. And from an objective perspective, if the government of Rwanda was truly attempting to prevent criticism from Human Rights Watch, it doesn’t seem as if refusing to grant a single visa to a single researcher would be a particularly effective means.

As for the remaining criticism coming out of the international press, it always seems as though there is some train of thought that justifies what immediately seems to be a blatant affront to human rights and political freedom. If anyone has read the Times article regarding the so-called Island Prison in Rwanda, I hope you have also read the Minister of Youth’s response that came out in the Opinion section. This exchange expresses my confusion (also see the BBC article regarding Kagame’s avoidance of lawsuits leveled against him by the widows of the former president’s of Rwanda and Burundi while visiting the U.S.).

Today, on my way into town for my traditional Sunday stay at Shokola, I found myself trapped along the mile long stretch of dirt road leading to my house. It was the march of a million women in support of gender equality. Either end of the dirt road was under heavy guard by the military and police forces, and people and cars bounced back and forth between both exits in utter confusion. I wasn’t allowed to get close enough to the road to even have a clear view of the march. In the distance I could only see masses of white shirts meander down the main roadway. I heard from a passerby that Kagame was a part of the demonstration.

I suppose I could be a cynic about all of this. Interestingly enough, I could probably be an optimist. I think it’s much more complex than that. Joining either side of this debate, that of the international press or that of the socioeconomic elite in Kigali, would be far too simple. Both of those perspectives are well justified, but somehow incomplete. Both are swayed by certain allegiances and preconceived notions about politics and freedom. I haven’t been able to reach any firm conclusions about this country. Perhaps Rwanda doesn’t need democracy right now. Perhaps it needs a strong hand like Kagame’s to bring it out of the utter destruction of 1994. I think the justifications of the issues above don’t really go far enough, and Western expectations probably go too far. What I do believe is that giving up on a strictly Western perspective is necessary when it comes to comprehending any truth that I might find in Rwanda. I look at it sort of like I look at haggling. Embracing the chaos, learning to love the chaos- I’ve learned to look outside of my “comfort zone.” Politics, metaphorically, can be similar- different, exciting, chaotic, un-American. And out of the chaos that consumes this society, I think there are better solutions than those offered by the West. Whether or not the current administration is evil or benevolent or necessary, I have to bring myself to a point where I don’t look at it as inherently flawed. I’m constantly overwhelmed, and it makes me a stronger person.

Impeach Bush and Cheney

9 May 2010

Kigali, Rwanda

I got stuck at a gusaba yesterday, as if it wasn’t strange enough to begin with. A gusaba is a traditional marriage ceremony. It precedes the actual wedding, and represents the process of bringing two families together through the negotiation of bride price. Aidah, our cook, invited us to the ceremony. As usual, we were the only mzungus there. On entering we received one of two responses, a blank stare or a inviting “you are welcome.” The location was outside of Kigali in a small umudugudu, or neighborhood. Driving in we saw Aidah walking along the side of the road in a traditional, draping fabric dress, yelling in Kinyarwanda to our driver. She told us to hurry as everyone was waiting for us to arrive so that they could start. We were instructed to sit on the second row, almost immediately behind the parents of the bride. The tent was constructed in a U-shape, one side for the family of the bride, the other for the groom. At the top of the U was a sort of altar with four chairs and several traditional objects- a bowl of beans, 10 milk jars, a Rwandan peace basket. Most of these things represent fertility and prosperity for the joining families. Everything was covered in varying leopard print fabrics and Rwandan baskets of all sizes.

On either side of the U, facing each other, were couches and small tables. A negotiator, usually a family friend, represented each family. These two men traded off arguments through a microphone in Kinyarwanda for about 20 minutes before the groom even walked into the tent. Dressed in flowing leopard print fabric and wielding a walking stick covered in goat fur, the groom and his groomsmen entered slowly and were seated near the back. Along with the groomsmen came several women that represented other potential brides in the family. At one point, the bride’s negotiator offered one of these women instead of the bride. Obviously, this was a joke, and the crowd laughed uproariously especially since this woman was approximately 50 years old.

What I found so strange about this ceremony was the juxtaposition of tradition and modernity. The attempt to maintain certain traditions was often compromised by the necessities of the present. The use of a microphone throughout the process was only the beginning. The bride was born again Christian, and refused to have alcohol during the ceremony. This contradiction of tradition was probably the most blatant, as beer generally plays a large role in this process. Instead, they used soda, mostly orange Fanta and Coca-cola. For example, at one point, the father of the bride is supposed to present the father of the groom with banana beer inside of a large Rwandan peace basket. Instead, upon opening the peace basket, a 2-liter of Coca-cola was presented. Humorous, yes. Traditional, no. At another point in the ceremony, each family has a sort of Rwandan wedding singer, each representing a shepherd of the cattle that is the bride price. Each came in to sing and dance about how beautiful and healthy the cattle were. At strategic points in their performance, an electronic “moo” came on over the PA. Both singers gave a flower to the bride’s family, and a pastoral stick to the groom’s.

This whole process takes around two-and-a-half hours. About two hours in, the bride appears. She was introduced by a series of dancers. First, the young females doing dances that represent cattle and fertility, followed by the intores, or male warriors. One of the intores, clad in his traditional headdress and fabric, wrap skirt was sporting a black t-shirt that read “IMPEACH BUSH and CHENEY.” Being the only Americans there that understood what impeach meant, we were the only people to notice how ridiculous this was.

Being in both Rwanda and Uganda for the past 4 months has made me almost immune to such awkward expressions of culture, but the tension between tradition and modernity is still almost unbearable to experience. The nostalgia for the past in these two societies is equally matched by a desire for the future, for development and all that comes along with it- capitalism, technology, Americanization. The love of American culture is almost palpable, as is the faith in the systems of American “success.” I feel sad and maybe a little bit guilty about this situation, and it’s probably because I have sub-conscious white guilt. Seeing how globalization has destroyed these traditions is disheartening, the death of culture. The imitation of Western culture is often associated with the loss of native tradition. But what I have realized is that this assumption is not really true. There is definitely a loss of tradition on some level, but it’s definitely not becoming homogenized with Western traditions. Like the pull of hyper-globalization, the pull of tradition is strong too. The gusaba I attended was probably not the same as one I might have attended 20 years ago, but even less so did it resemble anything I would find in the Global North.

I’m overcoming my former sadness regarding the loss of tradition, and instead recognizing the beauty in the joining of two cultures. Like the gusaba, I am witnessing the combination of two separate entities, becoming one, and making something new. I see expressions of this awkward cultural combination everyday; they’re entertaining, funny, strange, uncomfortable, and usually embarrassing. In the end, though, they’re African and recognizing how they are African is more important than looking for signs that they are not.

The Paradox of Progress

3 May 2010

Kigali, Rwanda

I finished my journal today. I mean that I ran out of pages and, luckily, I had a backup. There’s something about a new Moleskine- the smell, like the library smell has spoiled, the crisp pages, and the unscathed black cover. These qualities are all the more noticeable in comparison. My old one with its broken spine and yellowed pages smells the same with the hints of over usage- ink, mold from the rainy days, and dirt from the leaves flattened between the pages.

Finishing something like that can be profound. I’ve had this journal since high school. Part of that is because I hardly ever find time to journal in the States especially when I’m in school, and as a result more than half of it has been filled since I came to Rwanda in January. Going back and reading the things I wrote three years ago was a cathartic experience; it was funny too, to read the adolescent angst of those formative years. Seeing how I’ve changed and grown from my own perspective in my own tiny scribbles got me thinking about the road that has brought me to where I am- In a tiny room with too many clothes and a bed that’s too big in Kigali, Rwanda, I’m here for the summer. I stay up too late and wake up too early- weird bars and political discussions with the volume all the way up. Clothes and shoes and luggage cover the already inadequate floor space of my living quarters. My white brick walls remain bare. The red paint on the concrete floor is chipping. My door squeaks if I don’t close it all the way and I only have two books on my shelf.

Regardless of the mess, life is getting more normal now, whatever normal means in my life. I have routines and regular places. Trivia night is Monday. I went to my favorite café on Sunday and stayed there for four hours drinking macchiato and African and masala teas from tiny white pots. I took my shoes off and lounged back on the big couches and smoked cheap Rwandan cigarettes while I wrote in my journal like I was Hemingway or Camus or something. Friday night routines are becoming regular, alongside the consequent Saturday morning ones. And I've developed my reading list:

Indivisible Human Rights by Whelan

Outlines on the Philosophy of Right by Hegel (I just have to finally finish it)

and also books that I need to read more thoroughly than I did the first time:

Disgrace by Coetzee

The Politics of Land Reform in Africa by Manji

The River Between by Ngugi wa Thiong’o

It’s not long, but the books (mainly the first two) are going to be time and thought consuming for at least a month. Listen to me. Where does summer go in adulthood? Can’t I just find a sprinkler and make mojitos all day and run around and pull shenanigans? I’m pretty sure that’s what I’m supposed to do as a 20-something, revert to my childhood and drink and do everything I can to stay out of trouble. And read. My parents keep telling me that I need to get a regular summer job next time around, and maybe I will, just so I can do those things. And then I think about how bored I get without travel and accomplishment and mental challenges. I guess I could pick up a hobby and go on a road trip, but everything sort of pales in comparison to working at the largest government institution in Rwanda and backpacking Europe. Working in a Starbucks or Wal-Mart seems like a joke I might make about consumerism, not serious career prospects. I guess that’s the paradox of aging- nostalgia and ambition.

Reading through my journal, I saw a lot of both, probably more nostalgia than ambition. And as I walk home from work in setting sun, I look over the hills of Kigali, covered in multi-colored rooftops. In my slacks and tie, all I can think about is walking across a hot grass lawn and stepping into an ice-cold puddle of hose water, my shoulders on fire from the blazing Arkansas sun. Goosebumps run up my leg and cars drive slowly by in the street, almost as if the heat makes them lazy too. And as a moto-taxi whizzes past me, I’m jolted back to Rwanda soaking up the beauty of summer like an adult- in slacks and a tie. There’s something in that to be happy about too. I’ll never get back that form of my youth, and I’m nostalgic about that. But I have something better now- ambition.